Democratic Interpretation

Subject: FW: NAVY CHIEF HITS THE BULLS EYE....

Navy Chief lets loose a broadside.

America's military can win wars. We've done it in the past, and I have
absolute confidence that we'll continue to do it in the future. We've won
fights in which we possessed overwhelming technological superiority (Desert
Storm), as well as conflicts in which we were the technical underdogs (the
American Revolution). We've crossed swords with numerically superior foes,
and with militaries a fraction of the size of our own. We've battled on our
own soil, and on the soil of foreign lands -- on the sea, under the sea, and
in the skies. We've even engaged in a bit of cyber-combat, way out there on
the electronic frontier. At one time or another, we've done battle under
just about every circumstance imaginable, armed with everything from muskets
to cruise missiles. And, somehow, we've managed to do it all with the wrong
Army.

That's right, America has the wrong Army. I don't know how it happened, but
it did. We have the wrong Army. It's too small; it's not deployed properly;
it's inadequately trained, and it doesn't have the right sort of logistical
support. It's a shambles. I have no idea how those guys even manage to
fight.

Now, before my brothers and sisters of the OD green persuasion get their fur
up, I have another revelation for you. We also have the wrong Navy. And if
you want to get down to brass tacks, we've got the wrong Air Force, the
wrong Marine Corps, and the wrong Coast Guard.

Don't believe me? Pick up a newspaper or turn on your television. In the
past week, I've watched or read at least a dozen commentaries on the
strength, size, and deployment of our military forces. All of our uniform
services get called on the carpet for different reasons, but our critics
unanimously agree that we're doing pretty much everything wrong.

I think it's sort of a game. The critics won't tell you what the game is
called, so I've taken the liberty of naming it myself. I call it the 'No
Right Answer' game. It's easy to play, and it must be a lot of fun because
politicos and journalists can't stop playing it.

I'll teach you the rules. Here's Rule #1: No matter how the U.S. military is
organized, it's the wrong force. Actually, that's the only rule in this
game. We don't really need any other rules, because that one applies in all
possible situations. Allow me to demonstrate...


If the Air Force's fighter jets are showing their age, critics will tell us
that Air Force leaders are mismanaging their assets, and endangering the
safety of their personnel. If the Air Force attempts to procure new fighter
jets, they are shopping for toys and that money could be spent better
elsewhere. Are you getting the hang of the game yet? It's easy; keeping old
planes is the wrong answer, but getting new planes is also the wrong answer.
There is no right answer, not ever.


Isn't that fun?

It works everywhere. When the Army is small, it's TOO small. Then we start
to hear phrases like 'over-extended' or 'spread too thin,' and the integrity
of our national defense is called into question. When the Army is large,
it's TOO large, and it's an unnecessary drain on our
economy. Terms like 'dead weight,' and 'dead wood' get thrown around.

I know what you're thinking. We could build a medium-sized Army, and
everyone would be happy. Think again. A medium-sized Army is too small to
deal with large scale conflicts, and too large to keep military spending
properly muzzled. The naysayers will attack any middle of the road solution
anyway, on the grounds that it lacks a coherent strategy.
So small is wrong, large is wrong, and medium-sized is also wrong. Now
you're starting to understand the game. Is this fun, or what?

No branch of the military is exempt. When the Navy builds aircraft carriers,
we are told that we really need small, fast multipurpose ships. When the
Navy builds small, fast multi-mission ships (aka the Arleigh Burke class),
we're told that blue water ships are poorly suited for littoral combat, and
we really need brown water combat ships. The Navy's answer, the Littoral
Combat, isn't even off the drawing boards yet, and the critics are already
calling it pork barrel politics and questioning the need for such
technology. Now I've gone nose-to-nose with hostiles in the littoral waters
of the Persian Gulf, and I can't recall that pork or politics ever entered
into the conversation. In fact, I'd have to say that the people trying to
kill me and my shipmates were positively disinterested in the internal
wranglings of our military
procurement process. But, had they been aware of our organizational folly,
they could have hurled a few well-timed criticisms our way, to go along with
the mines we were trying to dodge.

The fun never stops when we play the 'No Right Answer' game. If we
centralize our military infrastructure, the experts tell us that we are
vulnerable to attack. We're inviting another Pearl Harbor. If we
decentralize our infrastructure, we're sloppy and overbuilt, and the BRAC
experts break out the calculators and start dismantling what they call our
excess physical
capacity.' If we leave our infrastructure unchanged, we are accused of
becoming stagnant in a dynamic world environment.

Even the lessons of history are not sacrosanct. When we learn from the
mistakes we made in past wars, we are accused of failing to adapt to
emerging realities. When we shift our eyes toward the future, the critics
quickly tell us that we've forgotten our history and we are
therefore doomed to repeat it. If we somehow manage to assimilate both past
lessons and emerging threats, we're informed that we lack focus.

Where does it come from, this default assumption that we are doing the wrong
thing, no matter what we happen to be doing? How did our military wind up in
a zero-sum game? We can prevail on the field of battle, but we can't win a
war of words where the overriding assumption is that we are always in the
wrong.

I can't think of a single point in history where our forces were of the
correct size, the correct composition, correctly deployed, and appropriately
trained all at the same time. Pick a war, any war. (For that matter, pick
any period of peace.) Then dig up as many official and
unofficial historical documents, reports, reconstructions, and commentaries
as you can. For every unbiased account you uncover, you'll find three
commentaries by revisionist historians who cannot wait to tell you how badly
the U.S. military bungled things. To hear the naysayers tell it, we could
take lessons in organization and leadership from the Keystone Cops.

We really only have one defense against this sort of mudslinging. Success.
When we fight, we win, and that's got to count for something. When asked to
comment on Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army's Lieutenant General Tom
Kelly reportedly said, "Iraq went from the fourth-largest army in the world,
to the second-largest army in Iraq in 100 hours." In my opinion, it's hard
to argue with that kind of success, but critics weren't phased by it.
Because no matter how well we fought, we did it with the wrong Army.

I'd like to close with an invitation to those journalists, analysts, experts
and politicians who sit up at night dreaming up new ways to criticize our
armed forces. The next time you see a man or woman in uniform, stop for ten
seconds and reflect upon how much you owe that
person, and his or her fellow Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and Airmen.

Then say, "Thank you." I'm betting you won't even have to explain the
reason. Our Service members are not blind or stupid. They know what they're
risking. They know what they're sacrificing. They've weighed their wants,
their needs, and their personal safety against the needs of their nation,
and made the decision to serve. They know that they deserve our gratitude,
even if they rarely receive it.

Two words -- that's all I ask. "Thank you." If that's too hard, if you can't
bring yourself to acknowledge the dedication, sincerity and sacrifice of
your defenders, then I have a backup plan for you. Put on a uniform and show
us how to do it right.

http://www.blackfive.net/photos/unca...rasmarines.jpg

"Douglas W. "Popeye" Frederick" <Buzcutt454@aol.com> wrote in message
news:11i5tsn33j8d725@news.supernews.com...
> Subject: FW: NAVY CHIEF HITS THE BULLS EYE....
>
> Navy Chief lets loose a broadside.
>
> America's military can win wars. We've done it in the past, and I have
> absolute confidence that we'll continue to do it in the future. We've won
> fights in which we possessed overwhelming technological superiority
(Desert
> Storm), as well as conflicts in which we were the technical underdogs (the
> American Revolution). We've crossed swords with numerically superior foes,
> and with militaries a fraction of the size of our own. We've battled on
our
> own soil, and on the soil of foreign lands -- on the sea, under the sea,
and
> in the skies. We've even engaged in a bit of cyber-combat, way out there
on
> the electronic frontier. At one time or another, we've done battle under
> just about every circumstance imaginable, armed with everything from
muskets
> to cruise missiles. And, somehow, we've managed to do it all with the
wrong
> Army.
>
> That's right, America has the wrong Army. I don't know how it happened,
but
> it did. We have the wrong Army. It's too small; it's not deployed
properly;
> it's inadequately trained, and it doesn't have the right sort of
logistical
> support. It's a shambles. I have no idea how those guys even manage to
> fight.
>
> Now, before my brothers and sisters of the OD green persuasion get their
fur
> up, I have another revelation for you. We also have the wrong Navy. And
if
> you want to get down to brass tacks, we've got the wrong Air Force, the
> wrong Marine Corps, and the wrong Coast Guard.
>
> Don't believe me? Pick up a newspaper or turn on your television. In the
> past week, I've watched or read at least a dozen commentaries on the
> strength, size, and deployment of our military forces. All of our uniform
> services get called on the carpet for different reasons, but our critics
> unanimously agree that we're doing pretty much everything wrong.
>
> I think it's sort of a game. The critics won't tell you what the game is
> called, so I've taken the liberty of naming it myself. I call it the 'No
> Right Answer' game. It's easy to play, and it must be a lot of fun because
> politicos and journalists can't stop playing it.
>
> I'll teach you the rules. Here's Rule #1: No matter how the U.S. military
is
> organized, it's the wrong force. Actually, that's the only rule in this
> game. We don't really need any other rules, because that one applies in
all
> possible situations. Allow me to demonstrate...
>
>
> If the Air Force's fighter jets are showing their age, critics will tell
us
> that Air Force leaders are mismanaging their assets, and endangering the
> safety of their personnel. If the Air Force attempts to procure new
fighter
> jets, they are shopping for toys and that money could be spent better
> elsewhere. Are you getting the hang of the game yet? It's easy; keeping
old
> planes is the wrong answer, but getting new planes is also the wrong
answer.
> There is no right answer, not ever.
>
>
> Isn't that fun?
>
> It works everywhere. When the Army is small, it's TOO small. Then we start
> to hear phrases like 'over-extended' or 'spread too thin,' and the
integrity
> of our national defense is called into question. When the Army is large,
> it's TOO large, and it's an unnecessary drain on our
> economy. Terms like 'dead weight,' and 'dead wood' get thrown around.
>
> I know what you're thinking. We could build a medium-sized Army, and
> everyone would be happy. Think again. A medium-sized Army is too small to
> deal with large scale conflicts, and too large to keep military spending
> properly muzzled. The naysayers will attack any middle of the road
solution
> anyway, on the grounds that it lacks a coherent strategy.
> So small is wrong, large is wrong, and medium-sized is also wrong. Now
> you're starting to understand the game. Is this fun, or what?
>
> No branch of the military is exempt. When the Navy builds aircraft
carriers,
> we are told that we really need small, fast multipurpose ships. When the
> Navy builds small, fast multi-mission ships (aka the Arleigh Burke class),
> we're told that blue water ships are poorly suited for littoral combat,
and
> we really need brown water combat ships. The Navy's answer, the Littoral
> Combat, isn't even off the drawing boards yet, and the critics are already
> calling it pork barrel politics and questioning the need for such
> technology. Now I've gone nose-to-nose with hostiles in the littoral
waters
> of the Persian Gulf, and I can't recall that pork or politics ever entered
> into the conversation. In fact, I'd have to say that the people trying to
> kill me and my shipmates were positively disinterested in the internal
> wranglings of our military
> procurement process. But, had they been aware of our organizational folly,
> they could have hurled a few well-timed criticisms our way, to go along
with
> the mines we were trying to dodge.
>
> The fun never stops when we play the 'No Right Answer' game. If we
> centralize our military infrastructure, the experts tell us that we are
> vulnerable to attack. We're inviting another Pearl Harbor. If we
> decentralize our infrastructure, we're sloppy and overbuilt, and the BRAC
> experts break out the calculators and start dismantling what they call our
> excess physical
> capacity.' If we leave our infrastructure unchanged, we are accused of
> becoming stagnant in a dynamic world environment.
>
> Even the lessons of history are not sacrosanct. When we learn from the
> mistakes we made in past wars, we are accused of failing to adapt to
> emerging realities. When we shift our eyes toward the future, the critics
> quickly tell us that we've forgotten our history and we are
> therefore doomed to repeat it. If we somehow manage to assimilate both
past
> lessons and emerging threats, we're informed that we lack focus.
>
> Where does it come from, this default assumption that we are doing the
wrong
> thing, no matter what we happen to be doing? How did our military wind up
in
> a zero-sum game? We can prevail on the field of battle, but we can't win a
> war of words where the overriding assumption is that we are always in the
> wrong.
>
> I can't think of a single point in history where our forces were of the
> correct size, the correct composition, correctly deployed, and
appropriately
> trained all at the same time. Pick a war, any war. (For that matter, pick
> any period of peace.) Then dig up as many official and
> unofficial historical documents, reports, reconstructions, and
commentaries
> as you can. For every unbiased account you uncover, you'll find three
> commentaries by revisionist historians who cannot wait to tell you how
badly
> the U.S. military bungled things. To hear the naysayers tell it, we could
> take lessons in organization and leadership from the Keystone Cops.
>
> We really only have one defense against this sort of mudslinging.
Success.
> When we fight, we win, and that's got to count for something. When asked
to
> comment on Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army's Lieutenant General Tom
> Kelly reportedly said, "Iraq went from the fourth-largest army in the
world,
> to the second-largest army in Iraq in 100 hours." In my opinion, it's hard
> to argue with that kind of success, but critics weren't phased by it.
> Because no matter how well we fought, we did it with the wrong Army.
>
> I'd like to close with an invitation to those journalists, analysts,
experts
> and politicians who sit up at night dreaming up new ways to criticize our
> armed forces. The next time you see a man or woman in uniform, stop for
ten
> seconds and reflect upon how much you owe that
> person, and his or her fellow Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and Airmen.
>
> Then say, "Thank you." I'm betting you won't even have to explain the
> reason. Our Service members are not blind or stupid. They know what
they're
> risking. They know what they're sacrificing. They've weighed their wants,
> their needs, and their personal safety against the needs of their nation,
> and made the decision to serve. They know that they deserve our gratitude,
> even if they rarely receive it.
>
> Two words -- that's all I ask. "Thank you." If that's too hard, if you
can't
> bring yourself to acknowledge the dedication, sincerity and sacrifice of
> your defenders, then I have a backup plan for you. Put on a uniform and
show
> us how to do it right.
>
>